Berkeley, California
The influence of market structure on the earnings of hospital-based nurses has attracted a considerable amount of interest among economists, due to considerations of both theory and policy.
On the theoretical level, the nursing labor market seems to be characterized by monopsonistic exploitation, given the small number of employers in most local hospital markets. On the policy level, the federal government has subsidized the training of nurses under the urging of the hospital industry. The reduction of the training subsidies in 1978 was due in large part to the acceptance by President Carter's advisors of the fundamental tenets of the monopsony model: the local nature of nurse labor markets allows hospitals to collude in holding down wages while seeking taxpayer support for increasing nurse supply.
A number of empirical studies have found a positive association between nursing wage rates and various measures of competition in local hospital markets. Based on these studies and the persistence of the nurse vacancy "crisis," many interested economists appear to have accepted the monopsony theory (for an exception, see Rosen [17] ). This paper extends the empirical analysis of market structure influences on hospital wages to include the influence of market structure on overall employment and occupational mix within hospitals. It extends the theoretical literature on labor market monopsony to include the important potential effects of product market structure on hospital employment. On the policy level, it provides a framework for anticipating the effects of the important changes during recent years in the functioning of hospital product markets.
The first section of the paper reviews the theory and evidence of monopsonistic behavior in local hospital labor markets. The recent literature on nonprice quality competition in hospital product markets is applied to the questions of employment and skill mix in the second section.
The third and fourth sections present the econometric specification and data to be used in the empirical analyses. Results are presented in the fifth section. A concluding section discusses the implications of the analysis for the understanding of recent policy initiatives in the hospital industry.
I. The Monopsony Model
The model of monopsonistic exploitation, due originally to Robinson [16] , was applied to the hospital industry by Yett [20] and Aiken, Blendon, and Rogers [1] . These authors argued that the supply of nursing labor in a local market was relatively wage inelastic: (i) nurses were tied to their occupations due to the training they had received and hence were insensitive to the relative wages of different occupations; (ii) their labor force participation decisions were based on childrearing responsibilities and the employment status of their husbands, and hence were also relatively insensitive to wage differences; and (iii) mobility by nurses was limited and wage insensitive since the family's geographical location decision was based on the husband's job possibilities.
Given the inelasticity of supply, any increase in the wage offered by one hospital in a local market would lead to a shift of already employed nurses from one institution to another rather than increase total labor supply. Since wages to those nurses already employed by one hospital would also have to be raised when it sought to attract nurses from a competing institution, the marginal cost of each new nurse gained would considerably exceed her own wage. It would be financially advantageous for hospitals to collusively set wages at a low level rather than engage in costly bidding wars.
This model yields empirically testable predictions under the assumption that the ability of hospitals to collude in limiting nurse wages depends on the number of hospitals in the local market and the distribution of market shares. If this assumption is true, one would expect wages to be higher in hospital markets with more competitive structures, other things equal.
Although these latter issues have not been discussed in the literature to date, the monopsony model also yields testable predictions concerning the relative mix of nurse and non-nurse employees in hospitals operating within different market contexts. The marginal cost of employing an additional nurse is higher in a monopsonistic labor market than in a market with comparable labor supply and consumer demand for services but a fragmented and competitive hospital industry.
Under the assumption that non-nurse labor markets are competitive in all local hospital markets, given the availability of non-hospital jobs for these workers, nurses are more expensive relative to non-nurses in monopsonistic than in competitive labor markets. The proportion of all hospital jobs filled by nurses, therefore, should be higher in competitive than in concentrated nurse labor markets. By extension, the proportion of all nursing jobs held by Registered Nurses (RNs) who have the greatest attachment to the industry due to their comparatively long training investment, should be higher in competitive than in concentrated local markets, with the other nursing positions being filled by the less trained Licensed Professional Nurses (LPNs). The monopsony model does not yield predictions concerning market structure influences on total employment, i.e., the sum of employment for workers with industry-specific skills and for workers with more general skills (i.e., maintenance and clerical workers).
A number of studies have examined the association between local market structure and hospital wage rates, including Hurd [8] , Link and Landon [10] , Fottler [7] , Sloan and Elnicki [18] , and Feldman and Scheffler [4] . These studies generally find the hypothesized positive association between degree of structural competition and level of wages across local hospital markets.
II. The Product Market
Monopsonistic labor markets are in principle compatible with any type of product market. If the goods and services are sold and consumed locally, then it is likely that the labor market monopsonist is also a product market monopolist. If, on the other hand, goods and services are traded on national or international markets, then the labor market monopsonist could face highly competitive product market conditions. Hospital services are sold in geographically restricted output levels subject to a break-even constraint, rather than to maximize net revenues [5; 6; 19] .
Second, until recently, hospitals have been reimbursed on the basis of costs incurred. This gives even for-profit hospitals strong incentives to maintain high output levels, since marginal costs tend to fall significantly below the average costs upon which reimbursement rates are set.
Several recent studies on the nature of competition in local hospital product markets provide a basis for expecting an association between product market structure and labor market policies.
These studies emphasize the role of public and private forms of health insurance in reducing the price elasticity of demand for hospital services while allowing different hospitals to charge different prices for similar services depending on the costs of production they incur. Hospitals compete on a nonprice rather than price basis. Dense hospital markets are the scene of more intense quality competition for physician affiliations and patient admissions than are monopolistic markets. This nonprice competitive process has been dubbed the "medical arms race." It has been found to take the form of excess capacity [9] , longer average lengths of patient stay [15] , and duplication of clinical facilities [11; 12] . Farley [3] and Robinson and Luft [13; 14] find production costs to be significantly higher in competitive than in monopolistic hospital markets, controlling for patient mix severity, hospital teaching role, and other relevant factors.
The theory of nonprice competition in insured hospital markets contains important predictions for nursing employment and earnings. Staffing inputs are highly visible to both physicians and patients, and are likely to play a central role in nonprice competition. Hospitals in more competitive local markets are likely to maintain higher ratios of nurses to beds than are comparable institutions in less competitive markets. They may also upgrade the quality of their nursing staff, hiring proportionately more Registered Nurses (RNs) and proportionately less Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs). Within the category of Registered Nurses, they may hire those with more advanced training and specialization. This would require raising wages.
The monopsony and medical arms race models produce the same essential predictions concerning the hospital's wages and skill mix. Wage rates will be higher in competitive than in concentrated local markets, controlling for cost of living and labor supply differences, due either to monopsonistic practices in concentrated labor markets or the upgrading of skill levels in competitive product markets. Employment levels for Registered Nurses relative to Licensed Practical Nurses will also be higher in competitive than in concentrated local markets, controlling for hospital size and capacity utilization, due either to restriction of employment by labor market monopsonists or raising of staffing levels as a marketing strategy in competitive product markets.
The arms race model predicts that total employment levels will be higher in competitive compared to concentrated local markets, while the monopsony model makes no predictions on this point.
If the structure of local hospital labor and product markets could be measured separately, the relative importance of the monopsony and medical arms race effects could be estimated. Given the geographical overlap of the two markets, due to their mutual dependence on travel time, this study will focus on the combined effects of labor and product market structure on hospital performance. Reduced form employment equations were specified as follows: EMP = blo + b11COMP + bl2SUPPLY + bl3SIZE + bl4HOSP + U1 MIX = b20 + b21COMP + b22SUPPLY + b23SIZE + b24HOSP + U2.
Here EMP is a vector of variables measuring total employment and employment of major occupational groups, while MIX is composed of two variables directly measuring the percentage of Census of Population and were obtained from the Area Resource File. They count nurses who are currently employed in the occupation, those unemployed but seeking employment, and those out of the labor force but whose last job was in nursing. Trained nurses who had been out of the labor force for more than five years are not counted, however. These data thus provide a reasonable measure of the potential supply of nurses in a given location during 1980.
A number of other important hospital-specific variables were drawn from the AHA survey.
Facility size is measured via four binary variables (100-199 beds, 200-299 beds, 300-399 beds, 400 or more beds, with less than 100 beds being the comparison category) and two continuous variables, one for the number of outpatient visits per year, and one for the annual number of births Table I RNs relative to LPNs to be nine percentage points higher than otherwise comparable hospitals in the least competitive markets; this should be evaluated in light of the sample average of 69% of nurse positions being filled by RNs. Nurses as a percentage of all employees has a non-monotonic relationship with market structure, with lower percentages of nurses being observed in especially concentrated and especially competitive markets. In the sample as a whole, 32% of non-physician jobs are filled by nurses.
Hospitals located in counties with larger supplies of RN and LPN labor report higher levels of employment for all categories of workers. The effect on nurse employment is as one would expect, given the tendency for large labor supplies to depress wage rates. (Nurse earnings in this data set were negatively and significantly influenced by nurse labor supply, controlling for hospital market structure, area cost of living measures, and other relevant factors.) The positive association between nurse labor supply and non-nurse employment is more surprising, and suggest that nurse and non-nurse staff operate more as complements than as substitutes in the hospital care production process. The effect of large nurse labor supply is proportionately greater for nurse employment than for non-nurse employment, however, producing a significant increase in the overall percentage of hospital jobs filled by nurses.4
County population is negatively associated with all four measures of hospital employment, 4 . It could be argued that nurse labor supply was endogenously determined by hospital wage rates and staffing levels, in which case the inclusion of labor supply in the staffing regressions would be inappropriate. The monopsony model rests in this case upon the assumption that geographical location decisions are based largely on career opportunities for their husbands, rather than on relative wage rates in different hospital markets. This assumption cannot be tested with these data. Exclusion of the nurse labor supply variables from the regressions reported in Table I does These findings on the association between market structure and hospital personnel practices in 1982 are important for understanding the recent turbulent events in hospital labor and product markets. The most important change has been the substitution of prepayment for cost-based reimbursement by Medicare and the growth of price competition for privately insured patients.
Taken alone, these events could be expected to reduce employment throughout the industry and,
given their probable greater impact on hospitals in competitive local markets, reduce the association reported in this paper between market structure and employment levels.
These changes in the health care financing system have, however, been accompanied by changes in the structure of local hospital labor and product markets. Labor markets are becoming considerably more competitive due to the proliferation of outpatient surgery centers and drop-in treatment centers that provide non-hospital employment possibilities for nurses and some types of medical technicians. These new institutional developments have served to make the treatment of patients at the low end of the hospital complexity scale more price-competitive. Treatment at the high end of the complexity scale may become less competitive, however, as hospitals in local markets merge to present a more united front in negotiations with insurers [2] . Hospitals in these increasingly concentrated markets appear to prefer avoiding price competition while competing for market share via nonprice quality of care strategies. Declines in monopsony power and continuing reliance on nonprice competitive strategies will both tend to increase employment in structurally competitive hospital markets. Taken together, these developments could significantly offset the cost-reducing tendencies of changes in financing mechanisms.
